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Making Clinical Trials Safer for Human
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Prof Michael Baramt

I.

CLINICAL TRIALS
The pace of medical innovation is quickening, pushed by advances in
biotechnology and pulled by growing demand for healthcare. Completion of the
Human Genome Project has provided a multitude of data for determining genes and
their functions, and stimulated the application of information technology and private
capital for the development of new individualized drugs, gene therapies, and
biomaterials for tissue and organ regeneration.' Concurrently, demand for healthcare
continues to grow, expanding the market for medical innovations that are proven in
2
clinical trials to be safe and effective.
Clinical trials, in which new biotech and other medical products are tested on
human subjects, provide much of the data used by the federal Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to determine whether the products are suitable for routine use
in healthcare. 3 Thus, the trials are of obvious importance to medical progress and
improvement of public health, and to those who have career and financial interests at
stake. 4 But clinical trials are also important to the human subjects involved because
the products being tested on them may remedy their illnesses, but may also pose risks

t
Professor of Law and Director, Center for Law and Technology, Boston University School
of Law. The author thanks Allen C. Nunnally for his research assistance.
I
See Denise Casey & Marvin Stodolsky, On The Shoulders of Giants: Private Sector
Leverages HGP Successes, HUMAN GENOME NEWS, Nov. 2000, at 2, 2.
2
Healthcare programs comprise 10% of gross domestic product in Germany, France, and
Switzerland, and 14% in the United States. See HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
INDUSTRY INTRANSITION, 2, 3-16 (1998).
3
The FDA has primary responsibility for the regulation of new drugs, medical devices,
"biologics" and other products, materials and therapies destined for medical use: See Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994); Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 201300aa-13 (1994) (originally Biologics Act of 1902); Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act
of 1997 ("FDAMA"), 21 U.S.C. § 353 (1997). Under these sources of authority, FDA requires and
regulates clinical trials for such advances to determine their efficacy and safety. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §
360e(c)(l)(A). A "biologic" has been defined as "Any virus, therapeutic serum ... vaccine, blood,
blood component or derivative, allergenic product, or analogous product . . . applicable to the
prevention, treatment or cure of diseases, or injuries to man," 42 U.S.C. § 262 (a). The agency has
also enacted various policies, for example, that "all gene therapy products are regulated by the FDA."
FDA, Guidance for Human Somatic Cell Therapy and Gene Therapy (March 1998), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/somgene.pdf [hereinafter FDA Gene Therapy Guidance].
4
See Marcia Kean, Managing Information on Clinical Trials Outcomes, 3 J. BIOLAW & Bus.
53, 53-55 (2000).
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since the products have usually not been previously tested on humans.5
The clinical trial is "a point at which research and the practice of medicine
intersect" 6 because it is supposed to be designed and managed to achieve dual
societal objectives: the generation of clinical evidence regarding the efficacy and
safety of new products, information needed by the FDA to determine whether the
products should be sold for medical use, and the responsible application of such
7
products to selected human subjects for potential therapeutic benefit.
In some respects, the clinical trial resembles the test procedures for introducing
other new technologies into society. For example, the introduction of a new
pesticide, aircraft, chemical manufacturing process, or method of producing energy,
requires carefully designed field tests to discern gains, risks, and the adjustments
needed to secure regulatory approval and societal acceptance. And like clinical trials,
the test procedures must assure reasonable protections for workers and other persons
exposed to these advances. 8
Thus, the introduction of a new technology requires testing by conducting a
carefully managed learning process with two main functions: an operational function
to discern whether the new product or process can efficiently provide anticipated
benefits, and a safety function to identify its risks, which may be latent and unknown
at the outset, and to determine if these risks are manageable. Experience in many
technological sectors indicates that the safety function is vulnerable to deliberate or
inadvertent compromise when it is managed by proponents of the technology who are
striving to achieve results which promise personal or organizational gain. 9
II.

GENE THERAPY TRIALS AND SAFETY ISSUES

Carrying out the safety function in clinical trials of new products containing
genetically modified materials poses special challenges. Little is known or knowable
beforehand about the risks posed by such advances, and many of the human subjects
involved have been chosen because of their seriously impaired health, making them
especially vulnerable to any risks. Compounding the challenge are contextual
circumstances such as the multiplicity of individuals and organizations commonly
5 See Gene Therapy: Is There Oversight for Patient Safety?: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Public Health of the Senate Comm. on Health, Education. Labor and Pension, 106th Cong. 28, 31
(2000) (statement of Amy Patterson, Director of the Office of Biotechnology Activities, National
Institutes of Health) ("Clinical research, including human gene therapy research, is not without risk.
Research is, by definition, experimental-if the outcome were known, the study would not have to be
conducted. Thus, the risks associated with the experimental treatment cannot always be predicted. For
this reason, there exists a comprehensive system of Federal laws, regulations, and guidelines pertaining
to the protection of human subjects in clinical trials.") [hereinafter Patterson]. See also James T.
O'Reilly, Elders, Surgeons, Regulators,Jurors: Are Medical Experimentation's Mistakes Too Easily
Buried?, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 317, 324 (2000) ("Experimentation by its nature involves trial and error.
Some drugs and devices will harm some patients in the process of perfecting the product. Society,
however, benefits from the learning that comes with experimental failure, modification and
replication.").
6
Robin Blatt & Michael Malinowski, Clinical Trials: The Intersection Between Research and
Medicine, 1 J. BIOLAW & Bus. 3, 3 (1998).
7
See Jonathan M. Fishbein et al., Domestic and Multinational Clinical Trials: Issues in
Design, Implementation, and Managementfor Biotechnology Research and Product Development, I J.
BIOLAW & Bus. 6, 10 (1998) ("The very nature of the therapeutic indication, its severity, the current
standard of care, and the availability of test subjects all greatly influence how the development
program will proceed. With these concepts in consideration, a clinical trial's design must maintain
scientific integrity and produce credible data.").
8
See generally SAFETY MANAGEMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE (Andrew Hale &
Michael Baram, eds., 1998) [hereinafter SAFETY MANAGEMENT].
9
See id. at 191.

MAKING CLINICAL TRIALS SAFER FOR HUMANS

involved in such a trial, making it a multi-party enterprise in which coordination and
communication difficulties may arise and cause responsibilities to become diffuse
and uncertain. In addition, there is urgency and pressure for success because of the
substantial investment of capital, facilities and human resources over the long period
of time usually involved in bringing a biomedical advance to market. t 0
The universe of biomedical advances now being tested includes many gene
therapies, products containing specially created genetic material to be delivered into
target cells of a person with the intention of curing the person's genetically-based
illness. The strategy is to have this transference of new genetic material repair a
mutated gene or inherited genetic condition, which is believed to be a contributing
factor in causation of the patient's illness, or provide genetic material that adds
missing functions or regulates the expression of other genes in order to defeat the
illness." Success, according to researchers, depends on effective delivery of the new
genetic material into the target cells of the patient by using a vector, usually a
disabled virus, in order to infect the target cells with the new genetic material and
have the new genetic material thereafter perform as intended.12
Since the first clinical trial of a gene therapy in 1989, some 4000 human
subjects have participated in over 500 gene therapy trials funded by the National
Institutes of Health (NIH), with numerous other subjects enrolled in privatelyfinanced trials approved by the FDA.13 Among the illnesses being addressed in the
studies are cancer, AIDS and other infectious diseases, cystic fibrosis, heart disease,
arthritis and Alzheimer's. The trials increasingly involve delivery alternatives to
viral vectors, and more diverse subjects, with most of the trials to date focused on
safety rather than efficacy. Thus, NIH cautiously refers to this technology as "gene
transfer" rather than "gene therapy" until evidence of efficacy in terms of therapeutic
benefit is proven, and FDA reports that as of January 2000, it had not received any
14
application to license a gene therapy product for use in healthcare.
NIH has indicated its concern for several types of risks to the subjects:
inadvertent transfer of the new genetic material to the subject's reproductive cells
which could result in changes being passed on to offspring; transfer to the subject's
non-target cells which could pose sudden or chronic health risks to the subject; and
residual capability of a "disabled" viral vector to cause harm, such as infectious
disease in the subject and their close contacts.15
Public concern over the safety of clinical trials is periodically aroused by
revelations of harm and deaths among the human subjects involved. For example,
recent review of many clinical trials of new conventional drugs, involving some
45,000 children, has found eight deaths and numerous other adverse events. 16 In the
10

See supra note 6; see also THE FRUITS OF GENOMICS: DRUG PIPELINES FACE INDIGESTION

UNTIL THE NEW BIOLOGY RIPENS (2001).

II

See supra note 5.

12
13

See id.
See id.

From 1989 to January 2000, the FDA received 288 applications and over 800

amendments for gene therapy clinical testing, according to Dr. Jay Siegel, Director of FDA's Center
for Biologic Evaluation and Research. See infra note 11 8.
14 See infra note 118.
15
See supra note 5; see also Michael Baram et al., Human Gene Therapy Research:
Technological Temptations and Social Control, 7 THE GENETIC RESOURCE 10, 12-13 (1993); Reinhard
Kurth, Risk Potential of the Chromosonal Insertion of Foreign DNA, 772 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI.,

140, 140-51 (1995).
16
See Alice Dembner, Dangerous Dosage, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 18, 2001, at Al (reporting
that drug trials "have killed at least eight children and subjected hundreds more to harmful side effects

in the last seven years").
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case of gene therapy trials, such concern was first aroused in September 1999 by the
death of a young adult subject, 18-year-old Jesse Gelsinger. Gelsinger had a
relatively mild form of a rare metabolic disorder which was manageable through diet
and drug regimens. But, he voluntarily enrolled in a clinical trial of a gene therapy at
the University of Pennsylvania in order to test the therapy for the benefit of others
suffering from similar diseases related to liver function.17
Within one day of receiving the therapy, Gelsinger developed systemic blood
clotting. Over the next three days, he suffered respiratory disease, liver and kidney
failure, and then died. This tragic event, caused by overreaction of Gelsinger's
immune system to the adenovirus used to deliver the genetic material, was the first
death proven to be caused by a gene therapy trial, and prompted investigation of the
trial by NIH and the FDA. Investigators found that the researchers violated the trial's
protocol in numerous ways.' 8 As a result, FDA has initiated an administrative
proceeding to disqualify the principal investigator from further clinical studies.' 9
20
Gelsinger's family has also sued the researchers and trial managers for damages.
FDA and NIH thereafter investigated other gene therapy trials and found that
many subjects in these trials had suffered "adverse events," many of which had not
been reported by the researchers or organizations involved. 2 1 For example, medical
researchers at Cornell and Tufts Universities had failed to report to NIH six deaths
22
among their subjects in gene therapy trials for regenerating blood vessels.
Although some if not all the adverse events may have been due to the subjects'
underlying illnesses, the failures to report to the oversight agencies constituted
23
violations of their obligations regarding such events.
The investigations also illuminated a disturbing feature of many of these
reporting violations; namely that many of the researchers and organizations involved
held significant financial interests in the companies which made the genetically
modified materials being tested. 24 The influence of such financial interests in
compromising reporting duties and other safeguards has become a major issue for the
agencies.
Heretofore, the agencies have not regulated the financial ties of
researchers, relegating this matter to the universities and other organizations where
trials are conducted. However, studies now show that the universities have sought to
hire and retain biotech researchers in the face of competitive pressures by relaxing
traditional strictures on financial conflicts of interest. 25 As a result, many reforms
17 See Diana L. Bush, Gene Therapy Trials: The Role of the National Institutes of Health and
Conflicts ofInterest, 19 BIOTECH. L. REP. 576, 576-78 (2000).
18 See id. at 576, 578.
19 See Initiation of Disqualification Proceeding and Opportunity to Explain: FDA notice to Dr.
James Wilson, Univ. Pennsylvania Institute for Human Gene Therapy (Nov. 30, 2000), available at
http://www.fda.gov/foi/nidpoe/nl21.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2001) (summarizing violations of
"regulations governing the proper conduct of clinical studies involving investigational new drugs")
[hereinafter FDA Notice].
20 See University Sued Over Patient's Death Following Gene Therapy Clinical Trial, TOXIC L.
REP. 1031 (Oct. 12, 2000). A confidential settlement was reached. See Family Settles Suit Over
Patient'sDeath Following Gene Therapy Clinical Trials, TOXIC L. REP. 1227 (Nov. 30, 2000).

21
See Bush, supra note 17, at 576.
22 See Deborah Nelson & Rick Weiss, Gene Therapy Deaths Disclosed, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
3, 1999, at A10.
23 See id.; see also discussion infra Parts V,VI,VII.

24

See Bush, supra note 17, at 586-588. The Cornell and Tufts researchers were found to hold

equity interests in GenVac and Vascular Genetics, companies sponsoring their trials. See Richard
Knox, Physicians Deny Deaths Unreported,BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 4, 1999, at Cl; see discussion infra
Part VII.
25 See Bush, supra note 17, at 587-588. See also Bernard Lo et al., Conflict-of-Interest Policies
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aimed at lessening financial conflicts of interest have been proposed in order to
26
reinforce the safety function in clinical trials' management.
Can clinical trials of gene therapies be made safer for the human subjects
involved? This article addresses this question by examining basic ethical principles
for safeguarding human subjects in biomedical research; FDA and NIH safety
management systems for gene therapy trials; factors which can undermine the safetymanagement systems during performance of gene therapy trials; various reform
initiatives; and the potential value of safety management experience with other new
technologies and its transferability to the context of gene therapy trials.
III. ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR SAFEGUARDING HUMAN SUBJECTS
Over several decades, esteemed organizations have sought to provide ethical
guidance for protecting human subjects in medical experimentation and biomedical
research. Shocking revelations of sadistic experimentation by doctors in Nazi
Germany led to enunciation of the Nuremberg Code in 1949.27 The Code calls for
fully-informed, voluntary consent by human subjects as the essential requisite for
their enrollment in medical experimentation, and for prohibitions on experimentation
which is "random," "likely to cause unnecessary suffering or death," or which poses
28
risks which exceed "the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved."
These principles were amplified in 1964 by the World Medical Association in
29
its "Helsinki Declaration," a moral code of conduct for medical researchers.
Recognizing that medical research on humans may be done for various beneficent
purposes, the Declaration divides such activities into two broad categories: research
for the diagnostic or therapeutic benefit of a patient, and research done solely for
scientific purposes "without implications of direct diagnostic or therapeutic value"
for the human subjects involved. 30 Informed consent and other relatively
conventional principles of due care for patients are enunciated for the former case,
but new precautionary principles are set forth for safeguarding human subjects in the
second category. 3 1 With regard to research solely for scientific purposes, the
Declaration provides that "it is the duty of the physician to remain the protector of the
life and health" of human subjects involved, to discontinue research which, if
or societal
continued, would be harmful to the subjects, and not to allow scientific
32
interests to ever take precedence "over the well-being of the subject."
Over the next decade, marked by enormous growth in biomedical and
for Investigators in Clinical Trials, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1616, 1618-19 (2000) (examining the
shortcomings of current conflict of interest policies at leading U.S. medical schools); S. Van McCrary
et al., A National Survey of Policies on Disclosureof Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 343
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1621, 1624-25 (2000) (discussing the variation among policies on conflict of
interest at research institutions and suggesting that the current standards of disclosure may be
inadequate to maintain a high level of scientific integrity).
26 See Liz Kowalczyk, New Steps Urged on University Research Bias, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb.
21, 2001, at Al.
27 The Nuremberg Code, from Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military
Tribunals Under Control Council Law No.10, Nuremberg, Oct. 1946-Apr. 1949, Washington D.C.:
U.S. G.P.O., 1949-1953, availableat http://www.ushmm.org/research/doctros/Nurembreg_Code.htm.
28 Id.
29 Declaration of Helsinki, World Medical Association, June 1964, adopted by the 18th World
Medical Assembly, Helsinki, Finland ("statement of ethical principles to provide guidance to
physicians and other participants in medical research involving human subjects") [hereinafter
Declaration of Helsinki].
30 See id.
31
See id.
32

Id.
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behavioral research activities in the United States, the need to clarify ethical
guidelines for protecting human subjects in projects for scientific purpose became
apparent, and a National Commission was created to accomplish this task. The
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research issued its report in 1979, the "Belmont Report," which provides
the foundation for the protections now afforded human subjects in gene therapy and
33
other biomedical trials by government agencies.
According to the Belmont Report, research programs and projects must adhere
to three basic ethical principles: "respect for persons" through full implementation of
informed consent procedures; "beneficence" in research on humans by "maximizing
possible benefits" while "minimizing possible harms;" and "justice" in the
distribution of research benefits and burdens across society. 34 But despite thoughtful
discussion of the three principles, the Report concludes with permissive
recommendations. 35 Prescriptions, prohibitions and other strict limitations are
avoided, and an ethically-informed but flexible decision-process is propounded for
36
researchers to follow in designing and conducting activities with human subjects.
In striving to avoid restriction, the Report even attempts to refute the
Hippocratic maxim "do no harm" and replace it with a qualitative balancing analysis:
... avoiding harm requires learning what is harmful; and in the process
of obtaining this information, persons may be exposed to risk of harm...
Learning what will in fact benefit may require exposing persons to risk.
The problem posed... is to decide when it is justifiable to seek certain
benefits despite the risks involved, and when the benefits should be
37
foregone because of the risks.
Thus, the Belmont Report offers a morally-informed but ultimately permissive
guidance to biomedical researchers-namely some sort of qualitative cost-benefit
analysis-for determining the protections afforded to human subjects. Only a few
unavoidable limits on researcher discretion are expressed: e.g. "brutal or inhumane
treatment of human subjects is never morally justified," a higher level of justification
is needed for enlisting a "vulnerable population" (e.g. children, prisoners) as human
subjects, and "relevant risks and benefits must be thoroughly arrayed in... the
38
informed consent process."
Encouraged by the Belmont Report and other permissive rationales, including
those articulated by the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, 39 government
regulators and grant providers, and individual researchers and their organizations, are
now engaged in authorized clinical trials for new biotech products despite their
potential for harming the human subjects involved. According to Jesse Gelsinger's
father, "I have read that my son's death has been called by one of the leaders in this
field as a pothole on the road to gene therapy. His death was no pothole. It was an

33
See The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,192 (1979) (National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare)
[hereinafter The Belmont Report].
34

See id.

35

See id.

36
37

See id.
Id. at 23,194.

38

Id.

39 See Protection of Human Research Subjects and Creation of National Bioethics Advisory
Commission, Exec. Order No. 12975, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,063 (Oct. 3, 1995).
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40
avoidable tragedy from which I will never fully recover."

IV. GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF CLINICAL TRIALS
FDA and NIH require safeguards for human subjects in clinical trials of gene
therapy and other biomedical advances, but from different jurisdictional and cultural
stances. 41 FDA is mandated by several federal statutes to regulate drugs, medical
devices and "biologic products," 42 including gene therapy products. 43 It thereby
regulates clinical trials for such products if the findings are to be considered by the
FDA when it is subsequently called upon to determine whether the products are
sufficiently safe and effective to be sold and used in commerce. Thus, FDA
regulations govern gene therapy clinical trials, whether privately or publicly funded,
so long as the results will figure in subsequent marketing applications to the agency
44
for regulatory approvals.
NIH provides federal grants to researchers in academic and medical research
centers for scientific purposes. 45 Unlike the FDA, it is not a regulatory agency.
Nevertheless, it has responsibility to ensure that the research work it supports is
appropriately conducted. Thus, its policies, grant terms and conditions and generic
agreements with the researchers and organizations it supports obligate these parties to
adhere to approved research plans and protocols, requirements for avoiding fraud and
other forms of "scientific misconduct," various procedures for protecting human
46
subjects, and informed consent requisites.
Both organizations view protection of human subjects as an integral feature of
their responsibilities. However, FDA's regulatory culture emphasizes the agency's
needs for useful findings on efficacy and safety which will enable it to make
regulatory decisions which are factually supportable and otherwise credible. Thus,
protections for human subjects are implemented to serve this purpose. Similarly, in
NIH's research-promoting culture, safety of the subjects in trials it funds is
subordinate to the agency's drive for scientific progress, a condition which suits the
47
career and financial motives of researchers.
Subordinating the safety of the few persons in a trial to the "productivity
40 See Judith A. Cregan, Light, Fast, and Flexible: A New Approach to Regulation of Human
Gene Therapy, 32 McGeorge L. Rev. 261, 261 (2000) (citing statement of Paul Gelsinger in Gene
Therapy:Is There Oversightfor Patient Safety; Hearings before the Subcomm. on Public Health of the
h
Senate Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 1061 Cong. (2000)).
41
See generally, Fishbein, supra note 7; O'Reilly, supra note 5.
42 See supra note 5 and acccompanying text.
43 See FDA Gene Therapy Guidance, supra note 3, § IC.
44
The regulations apply to clinical research, whether privately or publicly funded, if the
research methods and findings are intended to support an application for FDA approval of the sale,
distribution and medical use of a product subject to its authority. See 21 C.F.R.§ 312 (2000) and other
sections on drugs, devices and biologic products. Thus, prior to developing or doing clinical trials on
such products, it is important for the potential applicant "to determine with the guidance of the FDA,"
the applicability of FDA regulatory review and clinical testing requirements. See Fishbein, supra note
7, at 7.
45 See Patterson, supra note 5, at 32.
46 NIH requirements are set forth in its Guidelines, and apply to projects it supports, as well as
other projects at institutions receiving NIH support for recombinant DNA work. See id. The
requirements are set pursuant to the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 201-300. Under this
mandate, NIH, the Department of Health and Human Services, and FDA have established a uniform
regulation on informed consent, 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2000), and delineated the oversight responsibilities of
Institutional Review Boards ("IRBs"), 21 C.F.R. § 56.101 (2000); 45 C.F.R. § 46.103 (2000).IRBs
have been dubbed as "silent overseers who operate in the paper-laden netherworld of research
institutions." O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 331.
47 See id.
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objectives" of clinical research, such as generating data useful to regulators or
making scientific progress, comports with the Belmont Report because emphasis on
productivity facilitates clinical research which may benefit many person-a gain
which conceptually outweighs the risks borne by the few subjects in each trial.
Conversely, elevating safety of the few subjects to primacy would have the effect of
burdening and obstructing clinical research and thereby retard the rate at which
biomedical advances are gained for the benefit of the many.
Nevertheless, FDA and NIH have sought to accommodate safety in their
governance of clinical trials. Both agencies require that researchers provide data to
show that the trials they intend to conduct would be reasonably safe, follow
precautionary procedures in choosing subjects and secure their informed consent,
monitor subjects' responses to the tests involved, and curb experimentation when new
information indicates subjects are endangered or harmed. Although the risks are
largely unknown before a trial commences, these requirements create a framework
for reducing uncertainties at the outset and managing residual risks thereafter during
experimentation.
Another safety feature employed by both agencies is the requirement for timely
reporting by researchers of adverse experiences. Such reporting is intended to
prompt investigation and evaluation of causes, corrective action-taking, and agency
dissemination of this knowledge to researchers in other trials so they will take
This approach resembles the
appropriate steps to protect their subjects.
"organizational learning" model for continuously improving safety management that
is employed in the chemical, nuclear and air transport industries, 48 and which has
been recently recommended for minimizing medical errors and thereby improving the
safety of patients in routine healthcare. 49 It is premised on the common sense notion
that the manager of a risky technology should learn to make improvements in safety
on a continuing basis by immediately capturing experiential information on harmful
incidents, determining their root cause and contributing factors, and thereafter taking
corrective action to prevent recurrence of the incidents.
Thus, both FDA and NIH strive to have researchers reduce uncertainties before
the outset of a trial, manage the trial in a precautionary manner, respond to problems
arising during the trial, learn from the problems to make the trial safer, and report
problems to the agencies so that this information can be used to make other trials
safer. A deeper look into these procedures and review of available evidence as to
their efficacy follows.
V.

FDA'S SAFETY SYSTEM

Any company or other party seeking to market a new drug or biologic, such as a
gene therapy product, must develop evidence of its efficacy and safety and then
secure FDA approval. To develop sufficient evidence, clinical testing on human
subjects must be done, and this also requires FDA approval. The researcher often
begins the process by conferring with FDA to clarify what the agency requires of the
proposed clinical trial, such as the details of design, rationale and research protocol,
and the data and models needed to assure the agency that the proposed trial would not
pose an unreasonable risk to the human subjects involved. This information is then
48

See generally

ANDREW

HALE

ET

AL.,

AFTER

THE

EVENT:

FROM

ACCIDENT

TO

ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING (1997) (discussing risk analysis and risk management in hazardous
industries); ANDREW HALE & MICHAEL BARAM, SAFETY MANAGEMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE

(1998).
49 See COMMITTEE ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO
ERR isHUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 8-10 (Linda T. Krohn, et al. eds., 2000).
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submitted in an Investigational New Drug (IND) application. Negotiation with the
FDA may then take place, particularly regarding safety-related uncertainties. Once
the IND is approved by FDA, the trial may begin, subject to continuing FDA
50
oversight.
Thus, the researcher and FDA jointly try to reduce uncertainties before the trial
to prevent unreasonable risk to the subjects. For conventional drugs,5' an important
safety assurance in the IND is a toxicity profile with data showing that human
metabolic processes will safely accommodate and break down the test substance. 52
But gene therapy poses more difficulty for the FDA and the applicant in attempting to
reduce uncertainty about risk before the trial"
Many biologics are based on entirely novel approaches to therapy and
are evaluated for therapeutic indications for which there are no existing
treatments nor guidelines. Therefore, the nature, focus and course of
the product development process is often unique, like the product itself.
In addition, .. .biologics are broken down by immunologic mechanisms
rather than by.. .metabolic processes.. .CBER [FDA's Center for
Biologics Evaluation and Research] recognizes this and generally
allows more creative approaches to development, without
53
compromising its high standards for safety and efficacy.
In addition, these products are usually protein or carbohydrate based, and often
composed of, or extracted from, a living organism, using unique methods. They can
undergo modification when exposed to heat and other stress, and are delivered in
most cases by disabled viral vectors, which pose additional risks. The initial doses
administered to the subjects must be cautiously determined for several reasons, one
being that prior tests on animals may be unreliable because the "activity of some
biologic products is highly species-specific-that is, animal doses do not always
54
extrapolate linearly to human doses."
These complexities must be resolved with data and models that assure
reasonable safety and rationale in the IND application 5 for the FDA to approve a
Phase I trial on a small number of relatively healthy subjects. Informed by promising
50 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.32; see also Siegel, infra note 118. Investigational clinical trials in
humans with gene therapy products are subject to FDA's requirements for drugs and biologics in 21
C.F.R. § 312 regarding the IND. As a product moves through Phase 1, II and Ill trials, various
regulations become applicable for biologics considered drugs, such as gene therapy products, and focus
on safety, purity, potency, and efficacy. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 200.5-200 (regarding Current Good
Manufacturing Practices); 21 C.F.R. §§ 300-300.100 (regarding new drug applications); 21 C.F.R. §§
600.3-90 (regarding biologics establishment and licensing).
51 Drugs are defined as "usually synthetic, organic compounds with defined structures and
physical and chemical characteristics...very stable and resistant to heat." Fishbein, supra note 7, at 8.
52 See Fishbein, supra note 7, at 7-8.
53. Id.
54 Id.
55 See id. The IND application must detail the product's composition and structure, proposed
dosage and routes of administration, the investigative plan and research protocol, data on prior animal
tests and human experience (including foreign data), information on any prior problems, and
withdrawals from investigation or marketing. 21 C.F.R. § 312 (2000); FDA Gene Therapy Guidance,
supra note 3 (for gene therapy products in particular). The Guidance calls for extensive data and
information on: the type of cell to be used, donor selection criteria, cell culture quality control and
banking procedures, materials used during manufacturing; the therapy product's potency, viability,
purity, and safety test results (pursuant to 21 C.F.R. 610); the vectors to be used, their sources,
characteristics, production and banking systems, routes of administration, potency, purity, safety, and
replicability; pre-clinical studies defining safe doses, toxicity parameters for target organs; animal
species selection and models of disease. See id.
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results, a Phase II trial is then designed, approved and carried out for a more thorough
examination of the product's efficacy and safety, usually with a larger group of more
diverse subjects, including persons with the targeted disease. The results will then be
used to carry out a further Phase III trial, done primarily to confirm previous findings,
establish the product's overall benefit-risk relationship, estimate its economic profile
when approved for sale, and provide FDA with a sufficient basis for labeling or
56
otherwise instructing the physicians who will ultimately use the product.
The second feature of FDA's safety system applies to management of the trials,
in which the test product is administered to selected subjects at specified dosage
levels. Here, the basic safety functions to be carried out by researchers and others
involved in trial management include: selecting the subjects according to predetermined criteria and securing their informed consent, monitoring the subjects for
evidence of harm, identifying new information from other sources which is relevant
to the safety of the product being tested, using such evidence and other information to
take action to prevent or mitigate harms to the subjects pursuant to "stopping rules,"
and reporting adverse experiences to FDA.57

The agency relies on the researcher, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) and
other elements of organizational management to ensure that experimentation is done
according to the previously approved project design and protocol, that the procedures
outlined above are followed, and that requisites for documentation and reporting are
met. 58 Since clinical trials may involve many subjects, take place at scattered sites in
several countries, and are increasingly done by obscure contract research
organizations for companies sponsoring the trials, management for full compliance
59
with FDA requisites and project protocol is a formidable task.
Imbedded in this web of requirements are reporting obligations. Seemingly
stringent, they are riddled with legalistic exceptions and deference to investigator
judgment on critical matters. The principle reporting obligation for the researcher is
to notify FDA and participating investigators in a written IND Safety Report of (1)
any adverse experience associated with the use of the test product that is both serious
and unexpected, and (2) any new findings from tests of laboratory animals that
60
suggest risk for human subjects.
An adverse experience is defined as "serious" if it has, as its outcome, death, a
life-threatening condition, inpatient hospitalization or prolongation of existing
hospitalization, a persistent or significant disability or incapacity, a congenital

56 Phase I is closely monitored to establish an initial degree of confidence about safety of the
product and dosage levels; Phase II is focused on efficacy for intended use as well as safety; and
larger Phase II trials seek to gain statistical proof of safety and efficacy. Finally, a Phase IV trial may
be conducted to confirm results and may extend, post-marketing, to study efficacy and safety in types
of persons who were not subjects in the preceeding trials, such as children and the elderly. See
Fishbein, supra note 7, at 9-10.
57 See supra note 50.
58 See id.
59 See Fishbein, supra note 7, at 13-16; O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 349-350; OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL,

U.S.

DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN

SERVICES,

INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

BOARDS:
PROMISING APPROACHES, No. OEI-01-97-00191 (1998) [hereinafter OIG REPORT].
According to O'Reilly and the OIG Report, clinical research consumes an estimated $4 billion
annually, with three-fourths being company-sponsored and increasingly out-sourced to Contract
Research Organizations (CRO's) and Study Management Organizations (SMO's) to reduce research
costs. See id. CRO's/SMO's are small new companies that are widely-scattered and can be difficult to
hold accountable to FDA procedures. See also Kurt Eichenwald & Gina Kolata, A Doctor's Drug
Studies Turn into Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1999, at Al.
60 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(a)-(c) (2000).
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anomaly or birth defect, or medical intervention to prevent such an outcome. 61 To be
reportable, the adverse experience must also be "unexpected," i.e. that its specificity
62
or severity is inconsistent with risk information in the project's investigational plan.
Further, if in the investigator's judgment, the adverse event was not caused by the
product bring tested, or if the event was "not unexpected" because it was deemed
foreseeable in the approved investigational plan, it need not be reported to FDA in an
63
IND Safety Report.
Another obligation is to file an annual report on the progress of the trial which
includes brief information on the status of the research and results to date, with a
summary of all safety reports submitted to FDA over the year. A list of subjects who
died with their causes of death indicated, or who dropped out of the study due to an
adverse experience, whether or not related to the product being tested, must be
included.64
According to a recent review of these requirements:
FDA's definitions leave a lot to the discretion of the
investigator... [and] may not be the best set of rules.. .the occurrence of
an adverse event may be easily attributed to the present condition of the
[subject] rather than a drug [related] experience.. .in most cases, it is not
in the researcher's best interest to report.. .when there is the possibility
65
that the event may not be [product] related.
The reports, as well as other communications and data provided FDA, are kept
confidential by the agency. 66 FDA monitors and reviews such reports and has several
action options available, including investigation of the trial, suspending the trial for
more intensive analysis by a special committee, terminating the trial, disqualifying
the investigator from further clinical research, and allowing trial continuation with
67
necessary adjustments for subject safety.
VI. NIH'S SAFETY SYSTEM
NIH has the mission of promoting biomedical progress by funding research
projects in universities, medical centers and other institutions in the U.S. and abroad.
Each project proposed for funding must undergo NIH evaluation and peer review
regarding its scientific merit and other features including risk to any human subjects
that will be involved. Projects which involve use of recombinant DNA (rDNA) are
61
62
63

See id.
See id.
See id.

64 See 21 C.F.R. §312.33.
65 Prashanth Vishwanath, To Report or Not to Report: Fallacies in the Notification
Requirements of Gene Therapy Trials, 5-6 (unpublished paper, Bioinformatics Dept., Boston
University, May 2000) (on file with the author).
66 "The reports submitted to the FDA are confidential and are not accessible to other
investigators in the field as well. In general, the Freedom of Information Act requires Federal agencies
to make their records available to the public upon request. However, this requirement does not apply
to, among other things, "trade secrets and commercial or financial information that is obtained from a
person and that is privileged or confidential." Under 18 U.S.C. 1905, it is a criminal offense for an
officer or employee of.. any Federal department or agency to publish, divulge, disclose, or make
known "in any manner or to any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the
course of his employment or official duties or by reason of any examination or investigation made by,
or return, report or record made to or filed with, such department or agency or officer or employee
thereof, which information concerns or relates to the trade secrets, (or) processes...of any person, firm,
partnership, corporation or association." This (precludes FDA] from making the information public."
Id. at 6-7; see also FDA Handbook, infra note 73.
67 See Siegel, infra note 118.
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subject to generic requirements set forth in NIH Guidelines, which have been
developed by NIH's Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) to assure that
68
such projects will not endanger workers, the public, and human subjects.
Therefore, researchers and institutions who receive NIH funding must comply
with NIH Guidelines for rDNA research involving human beings. For example,
researchers must submit documentation indicating that his or her Institutional
Biosafety Committee (IBC) and IRB have approved the project design and rationale,
the proposed informed consent form and subject selection criteria, qualifications of
the principle researcher, the clinical protocol, the purposes for using rDNA,
anticipated risks and benefits, pre-clinical information relevant to patient monitoring,
69
and public health considerations in order to secure NIH approval.
The RAC then conducts an initial review to determine whether "the human gene
transfer experiment presents characteristics that warrant public review and
discussion" under its auspices. 70 Factors in considering the necessity of public
review include the sufficiency of the safety data and models, ethical issues, and novel
features, such as proposed use of new vectors and delivery systems or unique
applications of rDNA to humans. 71 Proposals judged appropriate for public review
may not proceed until the RAC has obtained public comment and developed
derivative recommendations for the sponsor of the trial. 72 While neither NIH nor
RAC has authority to require that the recommendations be adopted, the review
procedure is nonetheless required and serves to influence the realm of NIH-supported
research. In contrast to the FDA, which maintains the confidentiality of all
information associated with an IND, 73 NIH employs a public review process which
74
creates pressures for researchers to adopt its recommendations.
Thus, NIH attempts to reduce uncertainties at the outset of a gene therapy trial
by employing a three-tiered process: peer review of the grant proposal; institutional
oversight by the researcher's IBC and IRB to assure compliance with NIH Guidelines
and other applicable precautions; and RAC oversight, public review and
recommendations for projects with particularly uncertain or novel features.
Once a project is approved after this fine-tuning process, NIH thereafter
essentially relies on the researcher's IBC and IRB to assure that tests on human
subjects meet NIH Guidelines and adhere to approved project design and protocol.
Evidence of non-compliance may result in suspension or termination of NIH financial
support and other sanctions applicable to the project researchers and their
institutions. 75 In addition, NIH revelations of non-compliance engender public
awareness and can lead to stigmatization of researchers and their institutions among
68 NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, (Apr. 1998) at
http://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/guidelines.html. These guidelines are constantly changing. Appendix M
covers the design and submission of protocols for clinical trials involving human subjects. For
description of the RAC and its functions, see Patterson, supra note 5.
69 See id. at app. M-I-Ill.
70 See id. at app. M-VI.
71 See id. at 84.
72 See id. at app. M-I-B-I.
73

FDA, A HANDBOOK FOR REQUESTING INFORMATION AND RECORDS FROM THE FDA at

http://www.fda.gove/opacorn/backgrounders/foiahand.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2001); 21 C.F.R. § 20
(1999).

74 While NIH promotes public awareness, it recognizes the potential sensitivity of the materials
involved in public review. Thus, it provides that while no submission may be designated confidential in
its entirety, a trial sponsor may indicate that specific portions of the materials involved are proprietary
or trade secret with appropriate explanation, so that NIH can determine whether to exclude such
information from public review. See infra note 174.
75 See NIH Guidelines, supra note 68, §§ I-D-l, I-D-2.
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peers. These consequences may ultimately obstruct further federal financing for the
non-compliant parties and make their recruitment of human subjects more
problematic. Non-compliance may also stimulate personal injury litigation by
subjects who have suffered harm and enhance their prospects for recovery of
76
compensatory and punitive damages or favorable settlement.
Ongoing compliance with the NIH Guidelines means that several types of
reports must be made by researchers. One of the reporting requirements is that
"investigators should report any serious adverse event immediately to the local IRB
77
and IBC, NIH/OBA and FDA followed by a written report filed with each group."
NIH defines the scope of such reportable events far more broadly than does
FDA.
A serious adverse event is defined as any expected or unexpected
adverse event related or unrelated to the intervention that results in any
of the following outcomes: death, a life-threatening event, in-patient
hospitalization or prolongation of existing hospitalization, a persistent
or significant disability/incapacity or a congenital anomaly/birth defect,
as well as important medical events that may require medical or
surgical intervention to prevent one of these outcomes.... [A]n adverse
event can occur for many reasons and not all of these are related to the
treatment, per se... Thus, a serious adverse event... during the course of
78
a clinical trial may be the result of the underlying disease ....
Significantly, serious adverse events are to be reported to NIH irrespective of cause.
In addition, precursor events and near misses, which do not ultimately result in harm
because of the medical or surgical interventions they trigger are nevertheless
reportable, whatever their cause. As a result, NIH affords less discretion to
researchers as to what to report than does FDA.79
Once such a report is received, NIH attempts to optimize its usefulness for
protecting human subjects in the trial in which the reported event took place, and for
protecting numerous subjects in other trials, current and future. It does the former by
investigating the trial and intervening to assure that appropriate corrective actions are
taken to prevent further such events or to order trial suspension or termination. 8 0
With regard to using the report to protect subjects in other trials, current and future,
the Gelsinger case is instructive. After receiving the adverse event report of
Gelsinger's death and the admission that it was cause by the gene therapy procedure,
NIH immediately notified the RAC, FDA, other government units, and all principal
investigators and their IBCs and IRBs involved in gene therapy testing. It also
requested data on pre-clinical and clinical parameters from its community of
76
77

See supra note 20
NIH Guidelines,supra note 68, app. M-I-C-4; see also Patterson, supra note 5, at 29..

78 Patterson, supra note 5, at 34.
79 Researchers complain that the NIH requirement is burdensome, too broad to be useful and
confounded by additional guidelines of other research funding agencies. For example, National Cancer
Institute Guidelines define an adverse event as "any unfavorable or unintended sign (including an
abnormal lab finding), symptom or disease temporally associated with the use of a medical treatment or
procedure regardless of whether it is related to the medical treatment or procedure." See NCI
GUIDELINES: ADVERSE EVENT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR NCI INVESTIGATIONAL AGENTS § 1.1

(Sept. 17, 1999). In addition, there is 'controversy over the confidentiality of information contained in
adverse event reports sent to NIH. Accordingly, NIH has proposed changes to its Guidelines to lessen
such concern by disallowing the inclusion of proprietary or patient identifying information, in such
reports. See Recombinant DNA Research, 65 Fed. Reg. 77, 655, 77,656 (proposed Dec. 12, 2000).
80 It can also suspend or terminate funds for all other rDNA research at the same institution.
See id. at 36.
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researchers using the same type of adenoviral vector that was used in the Gelsinger
trial, and provided such data to the RAC for thorough analysis and guidance
regarding continued use of such vectors.81
By evaluating the database derived from over 70 trials using adenovirus vectors
and involving more than 1200 subjects, a RAC working group identified the need for
vector standards, and for specific criteria to assure uniform surveillance and
monitoring of subjects. It also recommended that current trials may proceed but with
greater caution and more vigilant surveillance, and that conferences be held to
disseminate such information among researchers. Following review of the final
report and public comment procedures, NIH has indicated that it will adopt the
82
findings and recommendations and revise the NIH Guidelines accordingly.
NIH's strategy is to take the knowledge gained from such reports and
disseminate it broadly to realize its immediate potential for protecting subjects in
current and future trials, and by improving the NIH Guidelines and the safety
expertise of researchers, to assure its long term potential. It is now implementing the
strategy by holding Gene Therapy Policy Conferences to inform researchers, RAC,
and the public about safety, ethical and other issues, and is developing an interactive
3
web site and web-based database for multiple users.8
Thus, NIH makes full use of the organizational learning model by capturing
experiential information on safety problems, continuously developing improved
protections, and publicly disseminating such useful knowledge, in the context of its
realm of NIH-supported researchers and institutions. This contrasts favorably with
the more limited use of this model by FDA in its realm of research predominantly
sponsored by companies.
VII. BREAKDOWNS AND CAUSES
Not much is known about the efficacy of FDA and NIH safety systems for gene
therapy trials. Many of the trials subject to FDA regulation are company-sponsored
business ventures for gaining competitive advantage and profits. Thus, FDA's efforts
to reduce uncertainties at the outset of a trial, to ensure that trial managers perform
requisite safety functions, and to promote learning how to improve safety through
reporting procedures, are largely shrouded in claims of confidentiality.
In NIH's realm, reduction of uncertainties is done in a relatively open finetuning process, and learning is promoted by publicizing reports of adverse events and
openly developing improved safety measures. Although the efficacy and outcomes of
these elements of NIH's safety system cannot be precisely measured, the openness
with which they are conducted provides, at least, for some degree of accountability to
the public. However, between reduction of uncertainty and learning from adverse
event reporting lies trial management, over which NIH exercises little oversight. For
this function, NIH relies on institutional oversight and self-regulation.
As discussed earlier, clinical trials of conventional drugs have, from time to
time, been shown to be unduly harmful to the human subjects involved.8 4 But the
smaller and rapidly growing number of gene therapy product trials was unmarked by
adverse incidents until the death of Jesse Gelsinger. This adverse event, duly reported
to NIH with acknowledgment that the death was due to the vector used on Gelsinger,
prompted much public attention, NIH and FDA investigation of the trial, and their
81
82
83
84

See
See
See
See

Patterson, supra note 5 at 34.
id.
id.
Dembner, supra note 16.
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subsequent investigations of other trials.8 5 As a result, evidence has been rapidly
produced indicating breakdowns in the safety systems established by FDA and NIH,
along with indications as to their root causes. In the wake of these revelations,
numerous reforms have been initiated.
Evidence of breakdowns in the trial management aspect of the safety
system in
the Gelsinger trial, and indication of causes, are documented in the charges made by
FDA against Dr. James Wilson, the principal investigator and director of the Institute
for Human Gene Therapy at the University of Pennsylvania, in its proceedings to
disqualify him as a clinical investigator.8 6 FDA concluded that trial management
failed to comply with required procedures and that these violations occurred because
Dr. Wilson "repeatedly or deliberately violated regulations governing the proper
87
conduct of clinical studies...under [21 C.F.R.] parts 312, 50 and 56."
The breakdowns found by FDA include:
Failure to follow stopping rules prescribed by the project protocol: e.g.
failing to stop the study "if a single subject develops Grade III or higher
toxicity" as required by the protocol, despite knowledge that 5 subjects
had exhibited Grade III toxicity; and failing to document toxicity levels
for numerous other subjects. (alleged violations of 21 C.F.R. §
3 12.60);88
Failure to exclude persons from the trial who did not meet subject
selection criteria (four ineligible persons were subjected to
experimental testing); and failure to carry out tests to monitor subjects
(nineteen persons not monitored by such tests) as required by the
protocol (additional alleged violations of 21 C.F.R. § 312.60);89
Submitting misleading and inaccurate information to the IRB in several
instances, not informing the IRB of adverse events; and modifying the
protocol-required test procedures without IRB review and approval
(alleged violations of 21 C.F.R. § 312.66);90
Failure to "obtain informed consent" by not revising the consent
document to incorporate additional risk information, some of which had
been requested by FDA (alleged violations of 21 C.F.R. Part 50); and
failure to maintain adequate case histories of subjects tested with
investigational drugs (alleged violations of 21 C.F.R. § 312.62(b)).9 1
These findings indicate that effective institutional oversight and self-regulation of
trial management is highly dependent on the values and behavior of principal
investigators, and the capacity and diligence of IRBs.
Other studies and
investigations confirm this and provide additional evidence of investigator
misbehaviors and the ineffectiveness of their IRBs. As a result, it is now widely
accepted that IRBs are overwhelmed by trial oversight responsibilities and
documentation, are easily misled or ignored by researchers, and are unwilling to

85 See Patterson, supra note 5.
86 See FDA Notice, supra note 19.
87 Id. at 1. FDA's findings and charges against Dr. Wilson do not, however, seek to establish
why Gelsinger's death occurred, nor do they attempt to blame Wilson for the death.
88 Id. at 2-4.
89 Id. at 5-8.
90 Id. at 8-12.
91 Id. at 12-14.
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challenge institutional colleagues. 92 Although Gelsinger's death was appropriately
reported, NIH and journalists have since found numerous instances in other gene
93
therapy trials in which reports had not been filed.
For example, none of the six deaths that occurred in NIH-funded gene therapy
trials conducted by Tufts and Cornell University researchers were reported. 94 The
researchers claim that some if not all of these deaths were caused by the patients'
illnesses, and that several were reported to FDA. Because FDA keeps such reports
confidential, whereas NIH deals with them in public forum, speculation about the
motives of the doctors has arisen and been heightened by subsequent findings about
their financial interests in the companies making the gene therapy products they were
testing.95
Further investigation has increased public concern about the financial interests
of researchers and their institutions because financial interest seems to explain why
researchers avoid reporting adverse events or seeking IRB approval for deviating
from the research protocol. Thus, financial interest is seen as undermining trial
management and adverse event reporting, and thereby impairing the safety system for
protecting human subjects.
After Gelsinger's death, NIH reminded its gene therapy researchers of their
reporting obligations. The researchers responded with 691 adverse event reports
which they had not previously submitted,9 6 causing an NIH official to conclude that
"many investigators governed by the NIH Guidelines have been under-reporting" and
to promise to address this problem expeditiously. 97 Yet compliance by companysponsored researchers with FDA's reporting requirements has not been publicly
evaluated. Only after the Gelsinger death and attendant publicity did FDA agree to a
formal procedure whereby it would, each week, notify NIH of reports it had received
98
of adverse events pursuant to FDA reporting requirements.
The goal of learning to improve safety through FDA and NIH reporting
requisites will not be achieved until major obstacles are overcome. Some of these
obstacles are institutional as discussed above, such as the loophole ridden definition
of what FDA deems reportable, the confidentiality demanded by industry and
academics and conferred by FDA, the opaqueness of how FDA responds to reports,
and NIH and FDA delegation of compliance oversight to IRB's noted for their
insufficiency. Other obstacles are personal or individual with researchers, to whom
reporting adverse events may be seen as burdensome, wasteful and useless,
stigmatizing, career-threatening, and self-incriminating.99
But a deeper root cause of breakdowns in FDA and NIH safety systems,
particularly for the trial management and reporting functions, is now widely assumed
to be the financial stake that many researchers and organizations have in clinical
trials. There is new and ample evidence to support drawing inferences that prospects
of financial gain are so tempting that researchers and organizations are inadvertently
See OIG REPORT, supra note 59; O'Reilly, supra note 5.
See Bush, supra note 17, at 576 n.7 (citing Deborah Nelson & Rick Weiss, EarlierGene Test
Deaths Not Reported: NIH Was Unawareof Adverse Events, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2000, at A 1).
94 See id. at 582.
95 See Knox, supra note 24, at C1 ; Nelson & Weiss, supra note 22, at A10.
96 See Bush, supra note 17, at 581.
97 See Patterson, supra note 5, at 35-36.
98 Seeid. at 36.
99 See Michael Baram Shame, Blame and Liability: Why Safety Management Suffers
92
93

Organizational Learning Disabilities, in AFTER THE EVENT:

FROM ACCIDENT TO ORGANIZATIONAL

LEARNING 161, 196 (Andrew Hale et al., eds., 1997) (discussing that persons do not report errors for
fear of self-incrimination and because it could be career threatening).
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or even deliberately compromising safeguards, straying from protocols, evading IRB
oversight, and violating other FDA and NIH requirements intended to protect human
subjects.
The inferences are based on the assumption that such researchers and
organizations believe it is in their financial and career interests to compromise
burdensome safety requirements in order to speed trials to completion without safetyrelated interruptions, and to emphasize positive outcomes: i.e.
To produce good data on efficacy and safety for the FDA as soon as
possible because this quickens FDA approval and marketing the product
for profit. In the interim, rapid progress without reports of adverse
events can stimulate more private investment and public funding.
To make scientific progress which impresses NIH and peers because
this enhances the researcher's reputation, career, and prospects for
continued funding, stimulates private investment in the companies
making the tested products and the researcher's institution, and
ultimately enriches the researcher and institution who have equity
interests in such companies.
Although such inferences and assumptions cannot be readily proven and may be
unfair in specific cases, they are certainly plausible given the growing evidence of
financial stakes, and the fierce competition for continuous private investment and
grant support which is so vital to the companies and institutions engaged in
advancing biotechnology. In the Gelsinger trial, reporters probed for financial links
and found that the research institute at the University of Pennsylvania receives
substantial support from a company founded by the principal researcher and Institute
director, and that the University's conflict of interest rules were altered to permit his
ownership of 30% of the company's stock.10 0 The University itself opted for 15%.10 1
The University also gave the investigator the exclusive right to license patents
derived from his institute to the company and its corporate sponsors. 102 Although an
NIH grant funded the particular trial involving Gelsinger, the investigator and his
company had "financial interests in the outcome," (a matter which was disclosed on
the informed consent form used in the trial), primarily from the patents that would be
10 3
generated if the trial was successful.
In the trials conducted by Tufts and Cornell researchers discussed previously, in
which the researchers failed to report deaths to NIH (but did report in confidence to
FDA), some funding for the trials was provided by companies they founded and in
which they held equity interests.1 04 Similar findings have been made as a result of
investigating other research activities. 10 5
Neither FDA nor NIH restrict financial holdings or interests of researchers or
their organizations.
Obviously, company-sponsored clinical trials unavoidably
involve webs of financial interests between researchers, managers, sponsors,
100 See Bush, supra note 17, at 586; Joseph N. Distenfano, et al., Pennsylvania Biotechnology
Researcher Negotiated Corporate Funding, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, Feb. 27, 2000,
akailable in 2000 WL 14922081.
101 See Distenfano, supra note 100
102 See Bush, supra note 17, at 586; Distenfano, supra note 100.
103 See Bush, supra note 17, at 586 n.187; Distenfano, supra note 100.
104 See Bush, supra note 17 at 587 n209, (citing and summarizing Rick Weiss & Deborah
Nelson, Scientists Reminded to Report Deaths: FDA Responds to Gene Therapy Flap, WASH. POST,
Nov. 6, 1999, at Al5).
105 See Bush, supra note 17, at 587.

270

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 27 NOS. 2&3 2001

suppliers of gene therapy materials, and contractors, and preventing financial selfinterest in such trials seems improbable. Recognizing these circumstances, FDA
requires only that certain clinical investigators disclose potential conflicts and
indicate how bias will be avoided in studies submitted for FDA approval.106
For the realm of NIH-sponsored clinical trials carried out by faculty at
universities and medical schools, NIH has passively relied on such institutions to
implement appropriate conflict of interest policies to minimize bias. But these
institutions, competing for leading researchers who will bring in external funding for
research expenses and overhead, have, over time, altered their policies to be more
accommodating. The result is a diverse array of increasingly permissive policies
across academia,1 07 some of which have been found to be "substantially weaker than
the policies that govern some industry-sponsored clinical trials."108
A recent survey of policies at ten medical schools concluded with the
recommendation that "university-based investigators and staff be prohibited from
holding stock, stock options, or decision-making positions in a company that may
reasonably appear to be affected by their clinical research" after finding that "of the
10 medical schools we studied, only one had a policy that was close to this
standard."10 9 A parallel survey of 127 medical schools and 170 research institutions
came to the conclusion that substantial variation in their policies "suggests that the
current standards may not be adequate to maintain a high level of scientific
integrity,""] 0 but more cautiously recommended that "all federal agencies should
adopt a common conflict of interest rule... [and] research institutions should report to
federal agencies the substance of conflicts and strategies for managing them... [and]
both IRBs and research subjects should routinely be informed about conflict of
interest."ll Stung by these findings and recommendations, and wary of the prospect
that external regulation may be forthcoming, various reforms posing more restrictive
limits and greater transparency are being deliberated by medical schools.11 2 Further,
the American Society of Gene Therapy has recently taken the position that its
members should own no equity, stock options or other interests in the companies
whose products they are evaluating in clinical trials. 13
Nevertheless, other prominent organizations merely counsel better management
and more disclosure. For example, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission has
recommended "better management" and national guidance to "ensure that these
conflicts do not subject research participants to any unnecessary harm." 114 Others,
106 See Financial Disclosure of Clinical Investigators, 60 Fed. Reg. 5233, 5233 (1998). See
discussion in Allan M. Green, Increased Industry-Academic Interactions Lead FDA to Require
Financial Disclosure by Clinical Investigators, 3 J. BIOLAW AND BUS. 15 (2000). For further
discussion of FDA disclosure policy, see text infra notes 139-141.
107 See Bush, supra note 17, at 586-590; see also Lo, supra note 25; Van McCrary, supra note
25.
108 Lo, supra note 25, at 1619.
109 Id.
110 Van McCrary, supra note 25, at 1625.
III Id.
112 See Medical Schools Offer Rules on Doctors' Conflicts of Interest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,
2001, at A23.
113

See Conflicts of Interests in Human Research: Risks and Pitfalls of "Easy Money" in

Research Funding, 9 HEALTH L. REP. (BNA) 1378 (Aug. 31, 2000) (noting that the regulations require
disclosure of certain financial arrangements but do not impose limits or other similar restrictions)
[hereinafter Conflicts of Interest in Human Research].
114 Frances Miller, Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business When it Comes to ClinicalResearch (Feb.
13, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).

MAKING CLINICAL TRIALS SAFER FOR HUMANS

such as the American Medical Association" 5 and FDA,16 believe that fuller
disclosure offers the best solution. Thus, the assumedly corrosive effects of financial
conflict of interest on management and reporting procedures for protecting human
subjects awaits a solution that is acceptable, credible and effective.
VIII. SAFETY INITIATIVES
Deaths and other adverse events in gene therapy trials and findings that many
researchers disregard safety requisites have aroused public concern and mistrust of
medical researchers, and created pressures for reform. These developments have also
illuminated the inadequacy of the Belmont Report as ethical guidance, and the failure
of informed consent as a safeguard in the competitive world of clinical trials. 17
Federal officials have responded with an array of promises and actions which
attempt to fix agency oversight, improve regulatory compliance, and enhance specific
aspects of the safety system governing clinical trials." 8 However, the initiatives do
not lessen the pace and pressures of gene therapy trials and it has been aptly remarked
that "[t]ime will tell the extent to which the changes set in motion by these actions
will ultimately benefit the participants in human subjects research. 1 9
The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) has taken the lead in
trying to convince the public that federal oversight will become more effective. It
replaced NIH's Office for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR) with a new DHHS
Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP) intended to provide leadership on
safety matters for NIH and all other DHHS divisions. 120 It has launched training
programs on bioethics for researchers and IRBs, and indicated that such training will
henceforth be a condition for receiving NIH gene therapy research grants. 121 DHHS
has also threatened to seek congressional action which would authorize FDA to
punish violators of informed consent requisites more severely, with fines of up to
$25,000 for each researcher, and up to $1 million for the institution involved. And it
has created yet another advisory body, the National Human Research Protections
22
Advisory Committee. 1
Within DHHS, NIH and FDA have promised more specific guidances on
informed consent, which may require that independent observers be involved, and
significant incidents in a
that continued testing of subjects, after the occurrence of
23
trial, be conditioned upon their reaffirmation of consent.1
The Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) at FDA has also
promised "to improve human subject safety."' 124 First steps include new Standard
Operating Procedures and Policies (SOPP's), under which FDA will notify NIH each
week of reports it has received on adverse events and changes to research
See Bush, supra note 17, at 589.
116 See supra note 106.
117 See, for example, Larry R. Churchill, et al., Genetic Research as Therapy: Implications of
'Gene Therapy'for Informed Consent, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 38, 38-47 (1998).
118 See Carol Mason Spicer, Federal Oversight and Regulation of Human Subjects Research-An
Update, 10 KENNEDY INST. OF ETHICS J., 261, 261-64 (2000). See also Gene Therapy: Promoting
Saefty: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Public Health of the Senate Comm. on Health, Education,
Labor and Pensions, 106th Cong. (Feb. 2, 2000) (statement of Jay Siegel, FDA, DHHS); see Patterson,
supra note 5.
115
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121
122
123

See
See
See
See

124

Id.

120
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protocols, 25 and the convening with NIH of Gene Therapy Policy Conferences and
Workshops on vector safety, ethical issues, regulatory compliance, and the
standardization of toxicology studies. Also to be anticipated, according to FDA, is
26
more public information on gene therapy trials, and increased FDA inspections.1
Some of the initiatives have been challenged by company sponsors and research
organizations. The Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO), with a membership
of 850 companies, medical research institutions, and state biotech development
centers, has registered its opposition to initiatives which would disseminate
information on trials and adverse events and fail to protect "confidential commercial
and trade secret information."'] 27 BIO is also opposed to actions which would merge
FDA policies, which have been protective of company interests, with NIH policies
which are more responsive to public concerns. 128 Consistent with BIO's agenda,
others have proposed strengthening FDA's role and keeping it distanced from NIH,
and prohibiting "oppressive" strict liability for companies whose gene therapy
products prove to be injurious due to design defects.129
Finally, several FDA and NIH initiatives aim to make incremental changes to
specific aspects of the safety systems governing clinical trials. As conceptualized
earlier, the FDA and NIH safety systems each have three basic functions for
protecting human subjects from unreasonable risks:
(1) reduction of uncertainties regarding the safety of human subjects
before commencing a trial;
(2) management of the trial in accordance with the research protocol,
IRB oversight, requisites for testing and monitoring subjects and other
safeguards;
(3) learning from experience (e.g. adverse events) to continuously
improve safety within the trial, and by reporting adverse events to
cognizant agencies (e.g. FDA, NIH) for dissemination and analysis, to
thereby improve safety in other trials.
Each of these functions entails the performance of various analyses and procedures.
FDA initiatives for changing these requisites are particularly important because they
are destined for implementation at the working level in virtually all trials (whether
company or NIH-sponsored), and could therefore have great potential for improving
safety if the adjustments are properly designed, integrated and carried out.
IX. PRE-TRIAL REDUCTION OF UNCERTAINTIES
For many years, FDA has required that for approval to commence a clinical
trial, the applicant's IND must provide data and other information which
125

See FDA, MANUAL OF STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES AND POLICIES, §§ 9101.1

(Notification of NIH/OBA of Changes in a Gene Therapy Protocol); 9101.2 (Notification of NIH/OBA
of FDA's Receipt of Adverse Event Reports to Gene Therapy IND's) (Dec. 7, 1999), available at
http://www.fda.gov/cber/regsopp/regsopp.htm (last visited May 17, 2001).

126 See Siegel,supra note 118.
127 See
Biotechnology
Industry Association,
Oversight of Gene
http://www.bio.org/issues/genetherapy-120799.html (last visited May 17, 2001).
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Therapy,

at

See id.

129 See Cregan, supra note 40, at 284-87. But see O'Reilly, supra note 5, at 363: "As a
safeguard for patients, a statutory or common law tort standard of strict liability to fully compensate
test subjects for physical harm resulting from the experimentation [drug testing on elderly persons]
seems particularly sensible." For additional discussion of industry concerns over disclosures, see
Marcia A. Kean, Managing Information on Clinical Trial Outcomes: Legal, Business and Scientific
Implications, 3 J. BIOLAW AND BUS., 53, 53-55 (2000).
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demonstrates that uncertainties have been reduced to the extent that the trial can be
conducted without putting subjects at unreasonable risk. Another way of stating this
criterion is that the applicant must show that uncertainties have been addressed and
that any residual uncertainties that remain prior to trial are manageable during the
trial (according to the research protocol and other applicable safety measures) to such
130
extent that the trial will not unreasonably endanger the subjects.
FDA has therefore required applicants to provide information on any previous
human experience with the product to be tested, including investigational and
marketing experience in other countries; relevant toxicology studies, models and data
regarding risks to animals and humans; intended precautions and monitoring
methods; criteria for selecting subjects and "safety exclusions;" assurance that the
products will be made of sufficient quality and purity; and a protocol outlining the
13
experimental testing process and how it will be managed. '
However, FDA avoids prescriptive details and affords extreme flexibility to the
applicant: e.g "protocols for Phase 1 studies may be less detailed and more flexible
than protocols for Phase 2 and 3 studies;" 132 and although detailed protocols for
Phase 2 and 3 studies are called for, FDA advises they should be designed to
accommodate anticipated "deviations from the study design [which] may become
33
necessary" as the trial progresses.
As for the quality and purity of the product, FDA is similarly accomodating in
that it "recognizes that modifications to the method of preparation... and changes in
the dosage forms itself are likely as the investigation progresses.... 134 Therefore,
"[f]inal specifications for the.. .product are not expected until the end of the
investigational process."' 135 Even the toxicology information required by FDA to
support the applicant's determination that the product is reasonably safe may be
modified in accordance "with the duration and nature" of the proposed trial and be
36
supplemented with "informational amendments as product" development proceeds.'
Although FDA has issued additional guidance which "represents the Agency's
current thinking on the development and regulation of somatic cell gene therapy
products," it is non-binding and permits alternative approaches which satisfy
applicable laws and regulations.137 No rules or standards have been enacted which
would make reduction of pre-trial uncertainties more stringent and precautionary,
although the agency is working with NIH and others to evaluate viral vector risks and
138
to develop standard approaches to toxicology studies.
Then there is the troubling matter of researchers holding significant financial
130 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21, 312.40.
131 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23. According to FDA's Gene Therapy Guidance, supra note 3, IND
applications for gene therapies should follow the format described in 21 C.F.R. § 312.23.
132
133
134

Id. at (6)(i).
Id. at (6)(ii).
Id. at (7)(l).
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Id. at (8).
137 See FDA Gene Therapy Guidance, supra note 3, at 1.
138 See Siegel, supra note 118. Note that NIH has announced "there is insufficient preclinical
data to support the initiation of clinical trials involving pre-natal gene transfer" and cited 26 issues
which need to be addressed. NIH, Conclusions: Gene Therapy Policy Conference, Pre-Natal Gene
Transfer:
Scientific,
Medical,
and
Ethical
Issues,
(Jan.
7-8,
1999)
at
http://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/rac/gtpcconc.htm (last visited May 17, 2001). This action relates to highly
controversial germ-line gene therapy. However, neither NIH nor FDA have taken such precautionary
actions regarding clinical trials of somatic cell gene therapy, the subject of all gene therapy trials to
date, even though a similar set of issues could be compiled.
136
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interests in their clinical investigations, interests that go far beyond reasonable
compensation, such as owning or holding large shares in companies making the gene
therapy products being tested or having significant personal profit potential from
patents. At the pre-trial stage, this circumstance poses two credibility problems: (1)
is the safety data provided to FDA in the IND process, in order to commence a
clinical trial, reliable, or has it come from prior research in which the investigators
involved held financial interests sufficient to cast doubt on the reliability of the
findings, and (2) will the clinical trial the applicant now wants to undertake be
responsibly conducted if the researchers involved have strong financial interests in its
outcome.
FDA and NIH have left the issue of permissible financial interests of medical
researchers to their institutions, and as previously discussed, the institutional
response has been inadequate so far. 139 Thus, FDA has taken the further step of
enacting a financial disclosure rule. This rule warns that any applications it receives
for marketing a drug or biologic (which must contain sufficient safety data) must
include information on the financial interests of the investigators involved in the prior
studies (which produced such safety data) in order for the agency to assess the
reliability of safety data at the time it reviews the marketing application. 140 Although
the Rule does not indicate any criteria as to how FDA will make the reliability
determination, nor open up the process to permit public accountability, it sends a
signal to industry sponsors and IND researchers that financial interests in safety
studies will ultimately be evaluated if the studies are eventually used to support a
marketing application.
However, in a follow-up non-binding Guidance, FDA has indicated that such
disclosure requirements regarding financial interests "would, in general, not include
Phase I tolerance studies ... most clinical pharmacology studies ...

large open safety

studies conducted at multiple sites, [or] treatment studies." In addition, where a
marketing applicant claims inability to provide financial information on all
researchers whose safety studies are included to support the application to market, the
applicant is allowed to certify that, despite "due diligence," it is unable to obtain the
information and include an accompanying explanation.141
It therefore seems that FDA has managed to avoid reviewing the financial
interests of safety researchers at any time, whether before experimentation on humans
is to be done, or later at the time their findings are used to support a marketing
application. As a result, financial interest is not considered by FDA to assure that
uncertainties have been reliably reduced to begin a trial, nor to determine whether the
safety aspects of trial management are likely compromised by financially-interested
researchers.
Thus, pre-trial reduction of uncertainty remains a confidential ad hoc process,
clearly in need of explicit standards for data and analytic models, specification of risk
and financial interest parameters, and transparency which would enable public
accountability. It affords the applicant extreme flexibility for determining what riskrelated information is relevant. Although FDA enlists the applicant's IRB in
reviewing the proposed work and can negotiate for more data and assurances, it is at
an informational disadvantage.
Since the entire process is confidential to
accommodate industry interests in protecting trade secrets, neither the applicant nor
139 See supra notes 99-116 and accompanying text.
140 See 21 C.F.R. § 54 (1998).
141 See FDA, Guidance for Industry: FinancialDisclosure by Clinical Investigators, (March
20, 2001), at http://www.fda.gov/oc/guidance/financialdis.htm.
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FDA is publicly accountable at this first critical opportunity to safeguard human
subjects. As a result, the advance of gene therapy, unlike that for many other
technologies, begins with a decision to expose humans to highly uncertain
experimentation and great reliance by the parties on subsequent trial management to
discern and prevent risks and mitigate harms.
X.

TRIAL MANAGEMENT

Because trials are undertaken despite considerable uncertainties and residual
risks, trial management bears major responsibility for protecting subjects. Not only
must it assure that research activities adhere to the protocol and meet other FDA
requisites, it also needs vigilance in taking additional precautionary actions. Thus,
trial management is expected to implement monitoring and other designated
procedures, continuously evaluate the adequacy of these procedures, and quickly
intervene as necessary to prevent or respond to adverse events-all of which should
be motivated by full regard for the safety of the subjects.
The management template provided by the research protocol and FDA requisites
calls for performance of many specific safety related tasks regarding subject selection
and exclusion, informed consent, administration of designated doses to subjects,
testing and monitoring the subjects, adherence to stopping rules, documentation, and
reporting protocol changes and adverse events. 142 But as discussed earlier, FDA,
NIH and others have found numerous instances of researcher non-compliance with
these requisites, and inadequate performance by IRBs. 143 In addition, these failings
are accompanied by inadequate vigilance and precautionary-action taking, which are
more difficult to measure but starkly demonstrated in the Gelsinger trial. 144
To rectify non-compliance, FDA and NIH have developed training programs on
regulatory requirements and compliance responsibilities for researchers and IRBs, 14
promised to stream-line regulations, increase on-site inspection and more fearsome
enforcement against violators, and pledged to share more information with the public
because "transparency" is presumed to make researchers and institutions more
accountable and dutiful.' 46 In addition, FDA and the new DHHS Office of Human
Research Protections (OHRP) intend to enhance informed consent, improve protocols
and monitoring procedures, develop performance measures and promote private
certification systems for researchers, IRBs and others engaged in clinical trials, and
deter IRB shopping to prevent "sinking to the lowest standard."' 147 According to
OHRP, these activities will ultimately provide "an enhanced safety net for research
subjects that will optimize on-going oversight without redundancy."1 48
Thus, FDA and DHHS have determined that in order to improve safety through
trial management they will make the existing regulatory system more coherent, strive
to improve compliance by regulated parties, and promote a more proactive safety
culture. And they intend to accomplish these salutary goals through education,
142 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.21, 312.32, 312.33.
143

See Donna Shalala, Editorial, 343 NEw ENG. J. MED. 808-10 (2000).

144 See supra note 17.
145 See supra note 121; see also DHHS, PHS Policy on Instruction in the Responsible Conduct
of Research, (December 1, 2000), available at http://ori.dhhs.gov/htm/programs/finalpolicy.asp (last
visited May 17, 2001).
146 See Human Subjects Protections in VA Medical Research: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Veterans Affairs, 106th Cong. (Sept. 28, 2000)
(statement of Dr. Greg Koski, Director, Office for Human Research Protections, DHHS) at
http://veterans.house.gov/hearings/schedule1 06/septOO/9-28-00/gkoski.htm.
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inspection, enforcement of existing FDA rules, transparency, guidances, technical
assistance and other helpful outreach, and promotion of voluntary self-certification
systems. But as with their initiatives on pre-trial reduction of uncertainty, previously
discussed, the initiatives on trial management do not include proposals for new
standards, rules, permits, or other mandatory and enforceable regulations. 149
Whether this blizzard of non-regulatory, "soft-path" initiatives will be sufficient
to improve trial management awaits implementation and evaluation. Clearly, it
preserves the flexibility of the existing self-regulatory system, which affords great
discretion to researchers and sponsors. And by promoting voluntary self-certification
systems, 5 0 rather than imposing more prescriptive rules and performance standards,
which would be subject to federal audits and sanctions, it is extremely
accommodating to gene therapy proponents in business and academia.
However, experience in other technological sectors which also demand
flexibility for accommodating safety to progress and profit-seeking indicates that for
self-regulation and self-certification to be credible and action-forcing, they must
occur within a sufficient framework of federal standards and rules, explicit
performance parameters, and vigorous enforcement or influential market forces.
Thus, the advent and effectiveness of the chemical industry's Responsible Care
program, 51 the most prominent and detailed example of industrial voluntary selfregulation and certification, have been constructively influenced by the
comprehensive framework of federal standards and rules (both prescriptive and
performance or goal-based) applicable to chemical firms, vigorous enforcement and
criminal prosecution of companies and individuals, and market forces in the form of
demands placed on the industry by its customers and the public. 152 Since gene
therapy trials, and biotechnology in general, lack such a framework, self-regulation
and self-certification are of uncertain value for improving trial management of risks
to human subjects.
Another cause for concern about the FDA and DHHS initiatives to improve trial
management is that they intersect and will need to be integrated with numerous other
programs and initiatives to improve healthcare management. These range from
privately-run hospital certification systems and new federally-promoted plans which

149 "The FDA has not proposed any new FDA review office or new requirements for
biotechnology, stating that its current procedures were adequate for regulating biotechnology products"
but has "published several documents called 'Point to Consider' that manufacturers 'might wish to
consider' in their research and production of gene therapy products." Cregan, supra note 40, at 271.
15o See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Experts Callfor New Rules on Research, N.Y. TIMES, April 18,
2001, at A16 (regarding a proposed private accreditation system).
151 See Chemical Manufacturers Association, Responsible Care and Codes of Management
Practices, at http://www.cmahq.com (last visited June 7, 2001). The program consists of a set of basic
principles and six Codes of Management Practices for protecting worker and public health and the
environment from accidents and pollutants, a system for evaluating and verifying continuing progress
in implementing each Code, public reports on progress, and growing public involvement. In addition
to chemical manufacturers, the program has been joined by chemical distributors and shippers, and has
now been adopted by other chemical industry associations in over thirty nations. A company's failure
to implement or to show continuing progress results in its exclusion from the relevant trade association.
See Michael Baram, Corporate Management of Chemical Accident Risks, in ENVIRONMENTAL
STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY 227 (K. Fischer, J. Schott, eds., 1993).
152 The author participated in the development of Responsible Care as a consultant to the
Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), and in gaining its approval by CMA member companies.
Many provisions in the Codes of Management Practices are intended to enable chemical manufacturers
to improve their compliance with pollution control and accident prevention regulations, to manage their
processes and product marketing so that harms and tort liabilities are minimized, and to enable their
downstream industrial customers to also improve compliance and reduce harms and liabilities.
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aim, in part, to protect patients from medical error, 153 to private programs for
physician and institutional risk management to improve loss control, 5 4 and from
other private programs to increase physician adherence to clinical guidelines in order
to contain the costs of managed care, 155 to a mix of state, federal and private efforts
to improve compliance by medical institutions with numerous other healthcare
regulations. 156 Weaving the FDA and DHHS initiatives into this complex matrix of
existing programs will also have to be attentive to malpractice liability concerns of
medical researchers, IRBs and medical centers;157 to negligence, warranty and
products liability concerns of the companies involved; 58 and to issues of health and
liability insurance coverage. 159
As a result, effective implementation of the FDA and DHHS initiatives for
improving trial management presents a substantial challenge because it requires
successful completion of two complex integration processes. The first involves the
promised federal undertaking to integrate the initiatives with the programs and
requisites of the seventeen government units within DHHS (e.g. FDA, NIH, Public
Health Service, National Cancer Institute, etc.) so that a coherent, internally
consistent set of federal requisites for trial management emerges.
The second process will then involve integrating the resulting set of federal
requisites with the other programs and legal and economic considerations noted
above. Because each organization doing trial management has unique features and
has discerned its own optimal approach for addressing each of these other programs
and considerations, the second integrating process is best left to each organization,
whether academic or business. The main issue for federal officials, then, is how to
prompt such organizations into doing this integration and thereafter sustaining the
resulting comprehensive management system.
In this regard, useful experience has been developed in the realm of companies
and other organizations subject to the multitude of environmental regulations enacted
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In collaboration with the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ), EPA has fostered corporate efforts to develop and
implement facility-specific Environmental Management Systems (EMS) to assure
that each facility has a coherent environmental management system best suited to its
unique operational characteristics and risks for improving its compliance with federal
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33 J. HEALTH L. 263, 263-85 (2000). For prompting of new federal efforts, see Lucian Leape, Error in
Medicine, 272 JAMA 1851 (1994); To ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 49.
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GUIDE (1996).
155 See Michael D. Cabana, et al., Why Don't Physicians Follow Clinical Practical Guidelines?
A Framework for Improvement, 282 JAMA 1458 (1999). See also Michael Baram, Medical Error and
Responsibility in Managed Healthcare, in SAFETY IN MEDICINE, (Charles Vincent & Bas de Mol, eds.,
2000).
156 See Marcos D. Jiminez & Dana Foster, The Importance of Compliance Programs for the
Health Care Industry, 7 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 503 (1999) (discussing DHHS efforts to improve
compliance management in the healthcare sector and the incentives for the targeted institutions).
157 See Benda, supra note 154; and Wendy Mariner, Human Subjects Research, Law, Common
Law of Human Experimentation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY 654 (2000).

158 See Mariner, supra note 157; O'Reilly, supra note 5; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY §6 (1998); Biomaterials Access Assistance Act, 21 U.S.C. § 1601 (1998).
159 See Benda, supra note 154; O'Reilly, supra note 5.
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air, water, toxic chemical, and hazardous waste regulations. 160 Thus EPA and DOJ
have enacted policies which provide guidelines and incentives for EMS adoption and
implementation by a great diversity of firms. 161 The incentives include assurances
that EMS-managed firms will be subject to less inspection, and lesser civil penalties
in the event of an inadvertent polluting incident; and that the firms and their top
officials will be less likely to face corporate or individual criminal prosecution it such
an inadvertent incident occurs.
Given these incentives, many companies have installed an EMS as an integral
feature of facility management. An ideal EMS has several main features according to
EPA, DOJ, and industry consultants and attorneys.162 These features, outlined below,
impose responsibilities on a company's top management officials, and could be
readily adapted for improving compliance in organizations doing trial management
pursuant to the universe of DHHS and FDA requisites and initiatives.
Top management shall publish a comprehensive policy supporting
development and implementation of the integrated management system.
The organization shall assess the harms and risks created by its
activities, and establish specific objectives for reducing them as well as
for meeting standards and other regulatory requisites.
The organization shall educate managers and employees about the
integrated management system and the organizational procedures to be
followed to achieve the objectives, and share such information with the
public.
The organization shall establish appropriate operational and technical
procedures for implementing the integrated management system and
meeting the objectives, and make these procedures applicable to regular
employees and on-site contractors.
Managers shall be assigned responsibilities to provide for necessary
financial, technical, and human resources, employee and contractor
involvement, and the application of sanctions to violators.
160 See EPA, Environmental Management Systems, at http://www.epa.gov/ems/index.htm (last
visited May 17, 2001); Michael Baram, Improving Corporate Management of Risks to Health, Safety

and Environment, a chapter in forthcoming book on HSE Regulations (Andrew Hale, ed. 2001) and
presented at Symposium on HSE Regulation, Reimers Foundation and Technical University of Berlin,
Bad Homburg, Germany (June 1999). See also Swiss REINSURANCE CORP., ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPAIRMENT LIABILITY, (1998); John Voorhees, The
Changing Environmental Management Scene: FederalPolicy Impacts the Private and Public Sectors,
31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10079 (2001).
161 See
EPA,
Final Policy Statement
on
Incentives for
Self-Policing,
at

http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPA-GENERAL/2000/April/Day-l I /g8954.htm (last visited May 17,
2001); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for Environmental
Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or Disclosure Efforts by the Violator,
(July 1, 1991), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/enrd/factors.htm (last visited May 17, 2001). See
also U.S. Sentencing Commission, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, § 8A 1.2 (k)(I -7) (discussing consistent
criteria applicable to sentencing criminal violators of federal regulations).
162 See id.; Baram, supra note 160; J. Alden Lincoln & Michael S. Baram, Environmental
Management Systems: Best Management Practices, (Northeast Business Environmental Network
1997), available at http://www.nben.org/HTMLSrc/Forum/EMSMatrix.html (last visited May 17,
2001). The features are derived from analysis of EPA and DOJ policies and the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, supra note 161. See also Jiminez, supra note 156, for discussion of similar management
models regarding compliance with healthcare regulations on Medicare, billing organizations, nursing

and hospice facilities, clinical labs, etc. The DHHS Office of Inspector General has developed and
promoted several of these management models, as discussed.
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The organization shall monitor and self-audit its compliance with
applicable regulations and company procedures (some of which may
extend beyond compliance).
The organization shall have procedures for identifying and evaluating
performance deficiencies, accidents and near miss incidents, and for
taking timely corrective actions.
The organization shall document its goals, procedures, monitoring and
self-audits and maintain appropriate records of such information.
The organization shall promptly disclose regulatory violations to the
163
cognizant agency and cooperate with agency investigations.
Because there are no objective standards for precisely defining these general
features, companies undertaking an EMS look for "best practices" in their industrial
sector to adopt, and are also provided guidances by federal and state agencies.
Numerous issues have been raised, such as whether self-audit reports and other
internal documentation will be demanded by agencies and made publicly available or
be privileged and not accessible to others. 64 Nevertheless, proactive companies have
established EMSs and claim many benefits.' 65 Although not a fully tested
management model to date, it is consistent with and superior to privately-developed
"total quality management systems" voluntarily adopted by many companies in the
U.S. and abroad,166 and consistent with the chemical industry's Responsible Care
167
Codes of Management Practices, which are more detailed.
FDA and DHHS could therefore benefit from evaluating the EMS experience
and adapting the lessons learned to the academic and business organizations doing
clinical trials. Most of the FDA and DHHS initiatives are currently aimed at
researchers and IRBs. But the EMS experience indicates that greatest value can be
achieved when the primary target of management system reform is the cluster of top
officials at each organization because they have the power to legitimate and internally
enforce goals and management features, can be held legally-accountable, and are
therefore likely to use this power to gain the types of benefits offered by government
agencies. The DHHS Office of Inspector General, which has promoted similar
management models to improve compliance with various healthcare regulations,
168
should be enlisted for this purpose.
XI. LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE
Those who study, regulate and manage risky technologies agree that safety
management should be viewed as a dynamic process of continuous improvement in
preventing harmful incidents-a process to be accomplished by fostering
organizational learning from experience. Thus, procedures are implemented in many
technological sectors to quickly identify and analyze harmful incidents and near
misses, to mitigate these incidents, and to assure that timely action is taken to
163 See id.
164 See Baram, supra note 160.
165 Personal communications to the author by officials of companies belonging to the Northeast

Business Environmental Network (e.g. John Bailey of Acushnet Rubber, Lee Wilmot of Hadco, etc.,
1998-2001).
166 See International Organization for Standardization, Management System Guidelines, ISO
9000 (Quality Management Systems), ISO 14000 (Environmental Management Systems) (1996 and
subsequent amendments and additions), available at http://www.iso.ch/9000e/9kl4ke.htm.
167 See supra note 151.
168 See supra note 152.
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improve the safety management system in order to prevent such events from
69
recurring.1
For clinical trials of gene therapy, this approach involves identifying and
learning from adverse events involving subjects being tested in the trial. Obviously,
occurrence of an adverse event should lead to timely intervention to mitigate the
harm suffered by the subject, to corrective action to prevent recurrence of the harm to
any subject in the trial, and as appropriate, to the application of trial stopping rules.
In addition, reporting the adverse event to the cognizant federal officials (e.g. at FDA
or NIH), where the event can be analyzed and disseminated to other trial
managements, can lead to interventions to protect subjects in these other trials.
Finally, the knowledge gained from analysis of the event should contribute to
reducing risks in future trials, as developments following the death of Jesse Gelsinger
demonstrate.
Recognizing that these benefits can accrue, FDA and NIH require adverse event
reporting as one of the essential requisites of trial management. But as discussed
earlier, the agencies differ in defining adverse events, the reporting process, and the
mode of dissemination.1 70 FDA's definition of an adverse event is more permissive,
enabling researchers to avoid reporting if they construe the event as not being caused
by the product being tested, or as not unexpected; whereas, NIH calls for reporting
virtually all adverse events, whether or not product-related or expected. In addition,
FDA keeps reports of such events, and its dissemination of knowledge gained,
confidential; whereas, NIH deals with such reports and dissemination openly.171
Following the death of Jesse Gelsinger, FDA and NIH investigations found that
harms experienced by many subjects in gene therapy trials had not been reported.
Further inquiry determined two likely causes. In the case of FDA, researchers can
readily rationalize non-reporting when they feel the harm arose from the subject's
underlying medical condition. In the NIH case, researchers are prone to keep such
incidents from NIH in order to avoid burdens, disruptions of work, and adverse
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publicity with its harmful consequences for their careers and financial interests. 1
As a result, FDA and NIH are under pressure to convince the public that adverse
event reporting is a credible safety requisite. As a first step, they are emphasizing the
reporting obligation in communications with researchers and site investigations, as
well as in various educational and electronic forums. 173 NIH is taking steps to limit
the inclusion of proprietary information in reports in order to minimize what it would
have to keep confidential, and is making its requisites more specific for reporting
procedures, timing, and information content. 174 FDA has agreed to provide NIH, on a
weekly basis, with an outline of information on any adverse event report it
5
receives. 17
However, the agencies have not clarified what will become publicly available
under the new report sharing procedures, an issue which seems virtually
unresolveable under current mandates as "statutes prohibit the FDA from making
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proprietary information public," whereas "NIH must do so." 176 In addition, FDA has
not acted to close the legalistic loopholes in its definition of reportable adverse
events, nor has NIH acted to improve reporting compliance either by reducing the
disincentives for researchers or by more strictly enforcing the reporting requirement.
Thus, the likely causes of underreporting remain unaddressed.
Once again, it would be useful for FDA and NIH to evaluate experience in other
technological sectors which have adopted procedures for incident reporting in order
to facilitate organizational learning and continuous improvement in safety
management.177 For example, both EPA and the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) have process safety regulations applicable to firms which
make or use dangerous chemicals posing accident hazards, including requirements to
investigate and report each incident "which resulted in, or could reasonably have
resulted in, a catastrophic release." 78 The Chemical Manufacturers Association
(CMA) Responsible Care Program, in its Process Safety Code of Management
Practices, calls for member companies to voluntarily implement similar
procedures, 179 and the Center for Chemical Process Safety has been carrying out an
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investigation of how selected firms deal with "near misses."'
The nuclear power industry is subject to Nuclear Regulatory Commission
requisites for investigating and reporting accidents and accident precursors,' 8' and the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) implement the Aviation Safety Reporting System which
requires the filing of reports on near mid-air collisions by pilots of commercial
aircraft. 8 2 Finally, the National Research Council's Institute of Medicine has
recommended procedures for improving patient safety in routine healthcare. These
emphasize reporting of medical errors causing patient injury, and are being promoted
83
at federal and state levels.'
Each of these programs, as well as similar ventures in other industrial nations,
have encountered problems similar to those which confront FDA and NIH, such as
defining the types of reportable events appropriately to optimize learning and safety,
and setting up practicable procedures for reporting and analysis of the events and
using and disseminating the knowledge gained. In addition, each program must deal
with the chronic problem of break downs in reporting due to fears of blame, selfincrimination, or liability, and with defensive management attitudes which have the
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effect of chilling employee motivation to report.1
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The definitional and reporting problems are particularly problematic. 18 A
proper definition of a reportable event must not be ambiguous and permit self-serving
determination that certain important events are not reportable. Nor must it be too
broad and lead to an overload of reports, or too narrow and exclude what could have
been reports of value. Overcoming widespread employee reluctance to report and
management reluctance to receive reports requires organizational policy which
emphasizes the value of and provides incentives for reporting, and enforces reporting
requisites. Among the incentives employed are anonymity of the reporters in some
cases to avoid retribution, potential liability, and blame, and to confer recognition and
rewards for reporting in other cases. The reporting problem must therefore be
addressed with behavioral expertise. Thus, FDA and NIH should assess this
extensive experience with adverse event reporting in other technological sectors in
order to discern what has been learned and adapt this learning to make trial reporting
a more effective part of their safety systems.
XI. CONCLUSION
In our national endeavor to hasten the development of new biotechnology
products for improving healthcare, we have created a vast enterprise of clinical trials
in which experimentation on thousands of human subjects is performed without
sufficient regard for their safety and without reasonable prospects for their
therapeutic benefit.
We claim that the trials are governed by medical ethics embodied in the
Belmont Report and emphasize that informed consent serves as the primary safeguard
for human subjects. But we know that the Belmont Report merely offers a costbenefit framework which inevitably justifies high risk experimentation, and that
informed consent has negligible influence on whether a person enlists in a trial.
We allow our oversight agencies to enact non-binding guidances but shirk
stringent regulation and avoid setting explicit limits on the risks of human
experimentation. We also allow them to yield to the self-interests of the corporate
and academic proponents of human experimentation, to tolerate their financial
conflicts of interest which can have a deleterious effect on essential precautionary
attitudes and procedures, and to accept egregious claims that violations of research
protocols and the harms suffered by human subjects constitute proprietary
information which must be kept confidential in order to protect trade secrets and
potentially patentable subject matter.
We continue to rely on Institutional Review Boards to hold risks in check even
though their inadequacies are common knowledge. We also maintain an incoherent
and confusing array of rules, exemptions and ambiguous guidelines for conducting
trials safely and an arbitrary enforcement system which neither deters researchers,
managers and sponsors from violations, nor holds them accountable. And so we
tolerate a multitude of harms to human beings, most of which have not even been
duly reported.
Thus, we have drifted away from traditional regard for safeguarding humans in
the process of testing and advancing a new technology as quickly as possible in order
to gain its potential benefits. A responsible corrective course needs to be charted
because no outcomes justify degrading the process to the point where humans are
viewed as expendable resources.
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